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Abstract The paper examines the role of Credit Registries in the context of European 
consumer credit markets and the current policies of the EU in this area. It attempts to 
show the institutional challenges relating to some competing rights or interests among 
consumers and financial institutions, and the need for a strengthened prudential 
supervision of the financial system as evidenced by the recent crisis whose effects 
have spread into the global economy. In particular, it shows that there is a conflict 
between the right to data protection of consumers, the risk-management interests of 
lenders, and the prudential supervision of the credit system. The ultimate goal, thus, is 
to present some weaknesses of the current arrangements and to put forward a proposal 
that is probably controversial but that is intended to stimulate a debate from an 
alternative policy perspective that is wider than the current one. 
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Consumer credit reporting has become the instrument most extensively used by 
lenders to underwrite decisions on borrowings or the supply of goods and/or services 
to consumer customers. Lenders, in fact, access credit reference databases managed 
by third party providers (Credit Registries) in order to evaluate a consumer’s credit 
application and his or her creditworthiness. They provide to the credit industry and the 
market organized information on the performance of consumer borrowers, gathering 
information on their payment history and accounts, and issuing a credit report prior to 
the underwriting of a loan or the supply of goods and/or services. 
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Credit Registries are present in most EU Member States but their institutional 
structure varies depending on different policy objectives and the function that they 
perform in the economy and society. Examples of such objectives are the stability of 
the financial system, the fight against over-indebtedness of consumers, or a risk-
management tool in the interest of the profitability of the retail credit industry. Such 
distinction of the role of credit information providers reveals the distinction between 
public and private Credit Registries. While the former is institutionally designed to 
address the stability of the financial system and monitor the indebtedness of consumer 
households, the latter offers to the market risk-management tools to enhance 
economic efficiency and the profitability of credit providers irrespective of whether 
these are banks lending the money of third-parties (depositors) or any other entity 
doing business through the provision of credit in return for profit (Jappelli and Pagano 
2000, Jappelli and Pagano 2003, Jappelli and Pagano 2006, Ferretti 2008). 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore the role of Credit Registries in the EU, 
by attempting to show that the current provision of information to the consumer credit 
market presents some problematic aspects. Arguably, one of the most important ones 
refers to the function that Credit Registries perform in the economy and society. 
Currently, in fact, there seem to be ambiguities about such a function or the function 
that they ought to perform to serve the market. 
On the one hand, it should be stated that the role of information as a risk-
management tool is to enhance the economic efficiency and the profitability of credit 
providers irrespective of whether these are banks lending the money of third-parties 
(depositors) or any other entity doing business through the provision of credit in 
return for profit. This includes any business entity that provides credit to consumers 
outside the traditional way of crediting via banks, such as, for example, the variety of 
finance companies present in the Member States, telecommunications, remote-sales 
businesses, estate agents on behalf of landlords, etc. On the other hand, one should 
look at the role of information in credit markets for the monitoring of the indebtedness 
of consumer households and the prudential supervision of the soundness of the 
financial system in the public interest. 
This seems also particularly important in light of the new Consumer Credit 
Directive 2008/48/EC which, amongst its provisions, aims at creating an efficient and 
competitive single consumer credit market in an environment in which consumers 
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receive adequate protection. Article 8(1) explicitly requires creditors, when necessary, 
to consult relevant databases.
1
 
Moreover, the above distinction of the role of credit information providers has 
important implications over the existence and balancing of competing rights and 
interests that exist among consumers, financial institutions, and the general public. 
In fact, when processing and sharing personal financial information of 
individuals, the right of data protection is at stake. Data protection, however, is a legal 
right fully embedded in EU law which could be sacrificed or balanced only if opposed 
by prevailing rights or the general interest. This is also confirmed by the same 
Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC which in Article 9(4) clearly states that 
database access “shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 95/46/EC” 
on data protection. 
Consequently, as important legal rights and liberties are involved, the function 
of Credit Registries should be to clearly specify the design of the underlying 
databases and the institutional form that they take. Therefore, this paper states that it 
makes an important difference whether a Credit Registry performs a public function 
or a function in the private interest of credit providers. 
Finally, the recent financial crisis, whose effects have spread into the global 
economy, seems to confirm that when Credit Registries have been used as a risk-
management tool they have played a role in determining the segmentation of 
consumer credit markets into prime and sub-prime borrowers rather than offering an 
instrument to supervise the system. Hence, the ultimate goal of this paper is to present 
some important weaknesses of the current arrangements and to put forward 
considerations aimed at verifying whether it could be possible to reconcile the respect 
of the legal right to data protection of consumers, the risk-management and efficiency 
of credit providers, and a better prudential supervision of the financial system capable 
of monitoring its soundness and the levels of indebtedness of consumer households. 
 
The Role of Credit Registries in the Consumer Credit Market 
 
Typically, the process of granting credit begins when a potential customer approaches 
a lender and applies for credit or services/goods to be paid at a later stage. In the event 
                                                 
1
 Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008, OJ 2008 L 133/66. 
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the latter agrees to enter the credit agreement, such a relationship ends when the last 
statement of the credit line is paid back in accordance with the same agreement or, in 
the worst case scenario, when the credit is unrecoverable and/or disregarded following 
a debt recovery proceeding and a judicial procedure, or the judicial declaration of 
insolvency of the borrower. The recourse to debt collection procedures and legal 
actions, however, does not guarantee to lenders the recovery of the debt and, in any 
event, they are considered an instrument of last resort as they are perceived to be both 
costly and time-consuming (Bertola et al. 2006, San José Riestra 2002).  
Thus, risk-assessment and applicants screening have become particularly 
important for the consumer credit industry which has to deal with a large number of 
small-sum (often unsecured) credit lines. It is widely agreed, in fact, that in this sector 
profitability is only achieved by minimising the risk while ensuring that a sizeable 
volume of credit lines is granted. Hence, credit grantors consider information about 
borrowers vital for their risk-assessment purposes. Moreover, the small size of 
consumer loans means that it is not cost-efficient to implement the screening of 
consumers on a case by case basis (Bertola et al. 2006, San José Riestra 2002). 
Usually, when lenders evaluate borrowers to determine their creditworthiness 
for credit-risk assessment and management, they interview the applicants and ask 
them directly for personal information together with the relevant supporting 
documents. At the same time, they seek and gather information from their own 
databases developed through years of experience and business practice in the credit 
market. Such a source of information, however, is incomplete as it covers a lender's 
own past and present customers, but it does not contain data about the same 
customers' past and/or present relationship with other financial institutions nor, what 
is even worse from the lenders point of view, information about new (potential) 
customers and their past and/or present relationship with other providers. 
Thus, it is with the view to supplement comprehensive information about 
potential new customers that Credit Registries emerged and developed in the past few 
decades. At present, said missing sought-after information is made available to 
lenders through data sharing thanks also to the development of increasingly 
sophisticated information technologies. 
A further secondary use that can be made of such information is that of scoring 
consumer clients. This is a related, but separate and additional, use of personal 
information that avails itself of distinct technologies. It is a product that is a derivative 
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from credit histories. It adds additional features and allows further uses of credit data 
integrated with other data sources for additional purposes. Credit scoring, in fact, is a 
classification and profiling technique. It is essentially a way of recognising different 
groups in a population according to certain features, expressed by a combination of 
personal data including credit histories and other non-personal information, and 
differentiating them on grounds of parameters and classifications set a priori from 
statistics for a predictive purpose. In technical terms credit scoring models are 
mathematical algorithms or statistical programmes that determine the probable 
repayments of debts by consumers, assigning a score to an individual based on the 
information processed from a number of data sources and categorising credit applicants 
according to risk classes. They involve data mining techniques which include statistics, 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other fields aiming at getting knowledge 
from large databases (see, for example, Bigus 1996, Desai et al. 1997, Diana 2005, 
Handzic et al. 2003, Jensen 1992, Yobas et al. 2000). Credit scoring shares a number of 
issues with consumer credit reporting, as a large amount of personal data used to generate 
the score is built upon the latter. However, it also presents peculiar features and raises 
separate problems – such as, for example, issues of automated decision-making, 
discrimination, profiling, classification, relevance, proportionality, and accuracy – that 
deserve separate and additional legal analysis but are beyond the purpose of this study 
(see, for example, Ferretti 2009). 
In economic theory, Credit Registries have evolved as organisations providing 
information sharing devices in the financial system in order to meet the problem of 
asymmetrical information between borrowers and lenders. As seen, a credit 
transaction involves risks or uncertainties about the ability and/or willingness of the 
debtor to repay (so-called “transactional risks”). At the time of contracting, lenders 
want to assess whether borrowers will have the ability to pay when the repayment is 
due and/or that they will want to pay back their debt. These are two different types of 
risk because some people may be able to pay but are unwilling to do so, or vice versa, 
they do want to pay but due to unexpected changes in their circumstances may be 
unable to pay when the money is due. In this context, economists have identified the 
problem of asymmetrical information as the a problem that a party has when it does 
not have the same information as the other party regarding the risks involved, i.e., one 
party knows less than the other (as distinct from a situation where a party has less 
information than the ideal, known as “imperfect information”). In simple terms, 
 6 
lenders want to avoid lending money that will not be repaid: if they do not have the 
same information as borrowers, they will incur a higher risk of making bad business 
(Berger and Udell 1995, Diamond 1991, Jappelli and Pagano 2002, Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). 
The unwillingness to repay is known as “moral hazard.” It refers to the risk 
which arises from personal, as distinguished from physical, characteristics of a 
borrower that increase the possibility of an economic loss. It is a phenomenon 
normally associated with business credit: it occurs when entrepreneurs have 
incentives to invest in risky projects when a larger proportion of the cost is funded by 
a lender. If the project is successful, they have much to gain from any excess return, 
but if the project fails their losses would be limited by bankruptcy. Hence, in this 
circumstance, as lenders will suffer much of the actual economic losses, borrowers do 
not have the incentives to act prudently and may take excessive risks to attempt to 
maximize returns. Investments, then, could possibly become safer if entrepreneurs 
have more to lose, in particular if they are forced to bear a portion of the risk (Bertola 
et al. 2006). 
But moral hazard is now considered directly relevant also for the behaviour of 
consumers in the use of consumptive credit every time that a repayment reflects the 
willingness, not the ability, to honour one’s debts. As the theory explains, when 
deciding to repay, a rational agent weighs the gain of failing to repay vis-à-vis the 
punishment for default. Since small-size debts could not be cost-effective to recover 
by lenders, and debtors may receive no or little punishment by the law (it may take 
the form of personal bankruptcy in the few jurisdictions where it exists), a number of 
consumers may become prone to moral-hazard (willingly deciding not to repay their 
debts) (Bertola et al. 2006). 
Thus, by making available rapid access to standardized information on potential 
borrowers, Credit Registries represent the response to the demands of the market for 
this type of data, i.e., the needs of banks and other financial intermediaries. 
 
The Institutional Framework of Credit Registries in the EU 
 
From an institutional point of view, the main differentiating factor on how credit 
registries operate across Europe could be grouped under two main categories based on 
ownership: (a) privately owned credit information systems, also known as Credit 
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Reference Agencies (CRA); and (b) Public Credit Registries (PCR) generally 
managed by central banks or other national supervisory authorities (see Miller 2003). 
The state of affairs in Europe appears to be a mixed one: while in certain 
markets only PCR operate
2
, in the majority of them the consumer credit reporting 
business has been left to free market forces.
3






Consumer credit information systems in the EC are in most cases privately owned, 
normally in the form of companies with no restrictions on the type of shareholders, 
which may be either banks or other financial firms, as well as any other third-party 
market players. After all, in such circumstances CRA are profit-seeking incorporated 
companies that are subject to the same rules and regulations as every incorporated 
company doing business in the marketplace. 
Typically, CRA have a broad range of client members, from banks to non-bank 
lenders including a wide array of businesses and agencies. Consultation by lenders of 
CRA databases is not mandatory by law prior to the underwriting of credit and is 
carried out on a voluntary basis. Crucially, as participation by lenders in a privately 
owned consumer credit information system is not compulsory, the rules relating to the 
functioning of the system itself are not imposed by law or regulation but are 
contracted in a typical supplier-client relationship. The negotiating power of a lender 
changes from country to country depending on a number of factors, including for 
example competition in that market and/or maturity of the system (i.e., whether the 
CRA is a start-up activity with no or little client members or a well established one 
with wide market participation, as well as other conceivable situations in the 
between). The consumer's credit data collected and processed by CRA are supplied to 
the agencies by the lenders themselves, who build the CRA databases to share the 
information about their customers. CRA often claim that the information is supplied 
by the lenders on a reciprocal basis, i.e., the lenders are able to access the databases 
only if they contribute to it for the benefit of all the other contributing member 
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 Belgium and France. 
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 Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, 
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 Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain. 
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lenders. However, this mechanism of reciprocity relies on agreements between private 
parties and there is no ad hoc law or regulation in place to enforce it. 
CRA also provide their clients with related additional services, in particular 
statistical models to produce and sell credit scoring services by which they rate 
borrowers according to their credit history and their (believed) profile derived from 
the processing of information from different data sources. Where a wide range of data 
is available, the models may be intensively and increasingly used for purposes other 
than the assessment of borrowers’ creditworthiness, for example scoring customers to 
promote financial products, price loans, manage credit limits, etc. Very importantly, 
all these activities are, as a matter of fact, marketing activities that help lenders to 
segment the market and the client base and price loans, which also founded and 
helped the idea of having prime and subprime borrowers. 
In the end, CRA activities serve the risk-management and marketing needs of 
the financial industry (broadly defined, i.e., including both the banking and the non-
banking sector) and are designed to favour the increase of profitability. 
As happens in every private sector market economy, where companies are 
driven by the need to make profits and prevail over competitors, CRA are continually 
persuaded to study, develop and commercialise new products or services to retain 
their existing clients and/or acquire new ones, thus using data mining techniques on 
credit reference data and other data sources at their disposal - personal data are, after 
all, their core business and asset. 
 
PCR 
The picture illustrated above changes in those countries where public authorities have 
taken an active role in the management of Credit Registries. 
The Committee of Governors of the European Central Bank defines PCR as 
information systems "designed to provide commercial banks, central banks, and other 
regulatory bodies with information about the indebtedness of firms and individuals 
vis-à-vis the whole banking system" (Jappelli and Pagano 2003). 
PCR are institutions typical of continental Europe, where they first originated 
and developed with the objective of providing an information system for supervisors 
to analyse financial institutions' (banks!) portfolios. Reportedly, Germany established 
the first PCR in 1934, followed by France in 1946, Italy and Spain in 1962, and 
Belgium in 1967 (Miller 2003b). 
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From the definition provided hitherto, it appears clear that the information 
collected by PCR serves mainly two purposes: (i) to conduct the prudential 
supervision of banks, monitoring the health and soundness of the overall financial 
system of a country; and (ii) to assess and monitor the indebtedness of borrowers, 
both legal and natural persons. 
The first purpose means that PCR exercise a public function by furthering the 
general stability of the banking and payment system. As such, only banks participate 
in the system and are subject to the underlying rules, unlike CRA that also take in 
non-bank lenders as client members. This public function is alien to the information 
sharing systems of CRA that are designed to provide services in the interest of the 
profitability of a larger variety of lenders that includes, but is not limited to, banks. In 
this respect, CRA databases are accessible by an indefinite number of potential client 
members, as they are conceived as open systems with the additional incentive of 
bringing an increasing number of subscribers into play to respond to competition 
pressures. 
PCR, by contrast, respond to the need for safeguarding the financial stability of 
the national system, which requires the monitoring of the safety and soundness of 
banks. This is also referred to as “prudential supervision” to emphasize the 
“prudence” needed to manage banks, because – in very simple terms – banks collect 
and hold peoples’ savings/deposits, are a vital source of credit for businesses, and 
manage the payments system. 
Of course, prudential regulation, as with any public intervention in the market, 
has costs. The collapse of a bank, however, is very likely to have negative effects on 
other banks because of the knock-on effect that the failure to meet its obligation has 
on the complex chains of transactions of the banking system (a phenomenon known 
as “systemic risk”). The failure of a bank or parts of the banking system, then, is 
liable to have devastating effects on the economy at large and people’s lives. Failure 
of one bank may also affect the confidence of other financial intermediaries even if 
they are not directly implicated. Moreover, depositors may lose their money. The 
latter also need protection because at the time of banking they do not have the 
information that would enable them to assess the solvency and viability of a bank for 
their savings/deposits to be safe. Thus, traditionally the benefits for the safety and 
soundness of the system are perceived to outweigh the costs for banks of abiding by 
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the authorities’ prudential regulations (Brealey et al. 2001, Cartwright 2004, Lastra 
1996). 
The supervision of the financial system encompasses a number of complex 
issues and elements that are far beyond the scope of this work. What is relevant for 
this discussion is that, among the elements to achieve it, there is the need for the 
authorities in charge of such a public function to have adequate and timely 
information about the behaviour, leverage, and condition of banks vis-à-vis the whole 
system. Among the many types of information needed by the authorities – such as 
asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidity, internal systems of control and security, 
income and dividends, foreign operations, and so on – is included the regular 
reporting on past due loans and non-performing loans. This not only allows 
supervisors to be in control and have the information on the condition and 
performance of the supervisees to intervene in time in case of problems, but it also 
constitutes an instrument to promote transparency to favour greater reliance on market 
discipline. As far as this latter component is concerned, banks benefit from 
supervision in that they are provided with the instruments to control the quality of 
their loans. To favour this, PCR provide banks and supervisors with information about 
the indebtedness of borrowers vis-à-vis the whole system (Brealey et al. 2001, 
Cartwright 2004, Lastra 1996). 
The described different function of PCR from CRA offers an account of the 
form that the former take, as well as the design of the information system. In fact, 
although PCR operate in many respects like the privately owned CRA, substantial 
differences exist between the two. 
As in the case of private CRA, there is a two-way flow of customers’ credit data 
between the credit grantors and the PCR. However, the key difference between PCR 
and CRA is that, as anticipated, the former are generally managed by central banks or 
other states’ regulatory authorities. Essentially, financial institutions that are under the 
supervision of a country’s central bank or supervisory authority are required to report 
certain credit data on a regular basis to the PCR by law or other regulation. Thus, as 
participation in a PCR is compulsory, its rules are imposed by law or regulation, not 
under contract as occurs with CRA. This compulsory nature also means that PCR 
have complete coverage of the financial institutions of a country, and no bank lenders 
are left out as may happen when parties are free to negotiate whether to take part in a 
system or not, or which system to be part of if more than one exists (as it happens in 
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those countries where more than one CRA exist) (Jappelli and Pagano 2000, Jappelli 
and Pagano 2006). 
Equally, PCR have a legal basis for demanding that reporting lenders remedy 
possible inaccuracies or make available missing data. Failure to comply can result in 
sanctions that, by law, PCR may impose (generally, penalty fees followed by 
supervisory actions) (Miller 2003b). 
Indeed, such mandatory reporting and rules of participation represent a 
fundamental difference between PCR and CRA and have a decisive impact on the 
legal standing of consumer credit information systems. 
In a different way, the assessment and monitoring of the indebtedness of 
borrowers (the element marked as (ii) in the definition above of PCR) leads to another 
important difference between PCR and CRA, namely, that PCR have universal 
coverage of all loans above a threshold amount determined by law or regulation (such 
threshold varies from country to country), and the information consists of credit data 
disseminated in a consolidated form. This means that, unlike CRA, lenders have 
access to the total loan exposure of each borrower, there is no detail on individual 
loans, and no merger with other personal data or data mining occurs. Another 
important feature is that PCR operate under strict confidentiality for participating 
banks. Participants are assured not only that the data that they provide are 
disseminated in aggregate form, but also that they are passed only to other banks and 
for the sole purpose of credit granting. No secondary uses, data mining, or data 
manipulation are attached to the system. Of course, the data provided by the banks 
can always be accessed in detail by the supervisor in charge of the system in 
pursuance of one’s line of duty for the purpose of banking surveillance (Jappelli and 
Pagano 2000). 
In essence, thus, the two way flow involving PCR can be summarised as 
follows: the first flow is from the participating institutions to the PCR. The latter, in 
turn, consolidates the data on the loans granted to the same borrower by each bank in 
order to obtain the total indebtedness, thus reporting the aggregate indebtedness. PCR, 
therefore, do not report histories of individual loans but the borrower’s aggregate 
position with respect to the entire banking system (Jappelli and Pagano 2006). 
As anticipated, until now legislators did not consider information about credit 
operations below a certain threshold (i.e., small loans and other credit that constitute 
what today is referred to as “consumer credit”) to be either a threat for the prudential 
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supervision of a sound national financial system or a concern in relation to 
indebtedness, "since small loans have little impact on system solvency or risk" (Miller 
2003a, pp. 39). In reality, in the past the number of incidents where retail loan 
defaults have had serious consequences for a lender and, consequently, the financial 
system, is trivial. If ever, this may occur if a lender is over-exposed in one area of 
large sum lending such as mortgages and market circumstances become so peculiar 
that property prices collapse at the same time as interest rates rise (Heffernan 2005).
5
 
In those countries where PCR and CRA coexist, the threshold also demarcates 
the market segment below which CRA operate without the lenders having the 
opportunity to turn to PCR, while the same cannot be said as far as it concerns the 
provision of information above such a threshold.
6
 This segmentation, in fact, also 
enables CRA to collect and store information about operations above the threshold (in 
detail, rather than in the consolidated form as PCR). This is possible because the law, 
which makes their communication compulsory to the competent PCR, says nothing 
about their collection by others, i.e., it is not forbidden. Distinctively, in this upper 
market segment, CRA are able to collect and provide their member clients with 
information with a precise degree of detail (for example, particulars of each line of 
credit a borrower has with reporting lenders) as opposed to the consolidated form that 
PCR provide by rule of law or regulation. Again, this advantage is possible, as CRA 
are not bound by the same rules that fix the functioning of PCR (Jappelli and Pagano 
2006). 
This situation, however, may no longer be considered valid today after the 
financial crisis, that started in August 2007 and spread worldwide, was triggered by 
the accumulation of defaults of subprime borrowers (a combination of mortgages and 
household debit that led to mass defaults and the collapse of the housing market). This 
circumstance may suggest that all household debts may indeed be a concern for the 
prudential supervision of the banking system and that the reporting of operations 
below the thresholds explained above should be reconsidered. 
                                                 
5
 It should be noted, in addition, that even in the unlikely event of such an occurrence, banks minimize 
exposure and the risk of failure through asset securitisation and/or the use of credit derivatives, 
complex financial operations where third parties - usually market investors - assume responsibility for 
the credit risk of the securitised assets. See Heffernan 2005, ch. 2. 
6
 This, of course, unless a specific law prevents them from doing so. 
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All the differences between CRA and PCR have induced some to argue that rather 
than being simple substitutes, the two seem to be complimentary parts of a country's 
whole credit reporting system (Jappelli and Pagano 2006, see also Jentzsch 2005). 
It seems undisputable from all the features discussed so far that, as the situation 
stands, PCR and CRA cannot be substitutes to the extent that the formers exercise 
functions in the public interest that the latter are not entitled to perform. PCR, 
however, can substitute for CRA to the extent that the lenders’ debt provisioning 
remains tightly controlled and the amount of overdue or defaulted debt is controlled. 
When a borrower that deals with a bank is already indebted, the PCR sends to the 
concerned lender the borrower’s aggregate position vis-à-vis the entire banking 
system. 
 
Current Institutional Headaches 
 
As far as CRA are concerned, the existing economic theory predominantly focuses on 
the economic side of consumer data sharing and insists on the prospective positive 
effects or results for lenders.   
It seems, however, that there is still neither consensus nor sufficient conclusive 
evidence to prove either their efficacy in the assessment of the creditworthiness of 
consumers or the validity of such envisaged solution. Indeed, recent experience shows 
that CRA did not allow one to see and to detect the coming financial crisis originating 
from households’ indebtedness, particularly in the US (and to some extent in the UK) 
where CRA are mostly used, developed, and sophisticated. On the contrary, for the 
amount and type of data that they collect, as well as the detail of the information 
supplied, it was proved that they were used to foster and encourage the segmentation 
of credit markets and to create prime and subprime markets where those borrowers at 
a disadvantage (the subprime market) were offered more costly loans that are more 
burdensome to repay as they are related to the risk-taking of lenders (rather than the 
other way round where those at disadvantage would pay less in order to be able to 
meet their repayment obligations). Besides, some have begun to suggest some forms 
of caution precisely in the interest of consumers. 
Interestingly, so far the issue of asymmetric information and the need for 
information sharing systems has been analysed from the viewpoint of the advantages 
for lenders, often neglecting the concerns of consumers. If it is true that some literature 
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points out some sort of benefits, in pure economic terms, that a thriving consumer 
credit market may indirectly and ultimately have on those consumers who repay on 
time and in full, then up to date research focusing specifically on concerns about 
possible violations or abuse of consumer rights and civil liberties seems almost non-
existent (see Miller 2003a). Intuitively, for instance, consumer credit reporting 
systems represent a threat to the privacy of individuals. In fact, there are sophisticated 
and highly technological mechanisms in place, where data from different sources are 
easily and quickly aggregated, new data are automatically created, and data are 
disclosed to a potentially unlimited number of third parties for a growing number of 
expanding purposes. 
Certainly, one may reasonably think that CRA induce an increase in the volume 
of lending, thus indirectly providing important benefits to those with good credit risks 
and arousing the interest of debtors too. According to this stance, it would be 
reasonable to expect that an increase in the profits of lenders would unequivocally 
result in more favourable credit conditions for those who fall within the classification 
of “good’ consumers.” This presumption reflects the view that there is a relative or 
close equivalence between the pursuit of the lenders self-interest in the maximisation 
of profits and the promotion of the general interest resulting in lower prices for 
consumers. This idea dates back to Adam Smith and his notion of the “invisible hand.” 
It relies on the economic assumption that in perfectly competitive markets, marginal 
private benefits equal marginal social benefits, and marginal private costs equal 
marginal social costs. Thus, in these terms, self-interest always promotes the interest 
of the community even though this is not part of the original intention (Smith 1776). 
As highlighted by many commentators, the traditional assumptions of perfect 
competition of Smith’s theory are that all market actors act rationally, in their own 
self-interest, with good and full information, all goods and resources are freely 
transferable, all markets permit free and easy entry and exit, and prior distribution of 
wealth and resources does not unfairly impact on competition (see for example Malloy 
2004). However, it is well accepted today that such assumptions practically never hold 
true in the real world, a circumstance Adam Smith was aware of (Smith 1790, see also, 
for example, Stiglitz 2006, Malloy 2004). 
Economic arguments on this subject are numerous, and they touch on 
contentious areas. What appears relevant for this discussion is that, in the situation 
studied here, the economic advantages would be for some consumers only (the “good” 
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ones), while others would be excluded or would be penalised by paying more (those 
who do not qualify as “good” consumers for not fitting in predefined criteria and who 
would arguably have more difficulties in repaying their debts and defaulting). 
At any rate, whether CRA really serve the interest of a number of debtors or not, 
seems hardly the point if one embraces the idea that economic efficiency does not 
stand in isolation. A different but related perspective, for instance, may be that of 
looking at other social concerns relating to the position of individuals in society, where 
they are not merely equated to consumers but valued as citizens. As Howells and 
Weatherill (2005) rightly point out, “if one wished to adjust the position of individuals 
in society rather than simply treat them as consumers within the economy, then it 
would not be deemed appropriate to leave the market to its own devices. (…) Wealth 
maximisation would be subordinated to wealth distribution and the consumer’s needs 
would attract keener attention at the expense of the consumer’s ability to pay” 
(Howells and Weatherill 2005, pp. 3).  
By contrast, the economic theory upon which consumer credit reporting by CRA 
is based seems to largely ignore a standpoint that emphasizes other social concerns 
that are rooted in equality and the protection of human dignity. For example, this 
would be the case where there is a tension with the right to privacy and the promotion 
of civil liberties. 
To begin with, it could be argued that there are no fixed rules in the industry and 
the literature alike as to what constitutes a good credit risk. Assuming that a good 
credit risk is someone with immaculate repayment behaviour, then the system seems 
to penalise those with a weaker credit history notwithstanding their personal 
circumstances. From this point of view, the profiling, classification, and 
standardisation of the behaviours of individuals not only appear hazardous for the 
civil right to privacy involved, but also artificial. The ability of these systems to detect 
atypical behaviours raises new questions and problems because they also make 
assumptions about what is normal behaviour, where deviation from the established 
pattern is seen as undesirable or questionable, with all the following implications. 
Very often, however, contrary to the very foundations of credit reporting, human 
behaviours are heterogeneous and unpredictable. At any rate, systems that may be 
beneficial to some consumers but exclude or penalise others could hardly be 
considered to be in the interest of society as a whole. 
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Most importantly, moreover, as will be shown in the following section of this 
work, it is difficult to think of data sharing instruments in the interest of consumers, 
which require the necessary sacrifice of individual privacy and are imposed 
unilaterally by the industry, with no democratic process having taken place and 
leaving them no option to decide whether or not to take advantage of their alleged 
benefits. 
It is already worth anticipating that it should be taken into account that in Europe 
at least, data protection rights now benefit from, and should be interpreted in light of, 
the provisions of the EC Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, as well as Art. 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
7
 
It is useful to stress that all the above concerns are exacerbated by the consideration 
that there is no conclusive or at least empirical evidence – nor a certain relation of 
cause and effect – as to the connection between the activities of CRA and the 
predictability of human behaviour. 
In addition, the theory that justifies the rationale for CRA has been criticised for 
being far from complete. According to Jentzsch (2006), for instance, “this literature is 
primarily incoherent because there are different approaches to information (…).  The 
economic implications of information are multi-dimensional and no model can 
integrate them all at once” (Jentzsch 2006, pp. 7). 
Others have begun to question the economic efficiency of giving a memory to 
the market, advancing the proposition that giving second chances to defaulting 
debtors may be justified not only on equity grounds but also on economic grounds 
(Jappelli and Pagano 2006). Unfortunately, this exploration has remained in its 
infancy and, as it stands, does not yet inform policy considerations. If anything, 
however, it shows that other routes could have been explored. 
 
The Current EU Legal and Policy context 
                                                 
7
 Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23/11/95, p. 0031-0050. 
European Convention of Human Rights, C 364 (2000), p. 0001-0022. 
Article 8 of the ECHR - Protection of personal data – states: 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to 
data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.” 
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At EU level the creation of an efficient and competitive single consumer credit market 
in an environment in which consumers receive adequate protection is a concern at the 
top of the agenda for the completion of the Internal Market. To reach this goal, the 
Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC
8
 proved to be ineffective. After years of 
intense discussions, the European Commission and the European Parliament have 
recently approved the text of a new directive on the harmonisation of the laws, 
regulations, and administrative provisions concerning credit for consumers.
9
  Among 
its provisions, Article 8(1) provides that: 
 
“Member States shall ensure that, before the conclusion of the credit 
agreement, the creditor shall assess the consumer’s creditworthiness on 
the basis of sufficient information, where appropriate obtained from the 
consumer and, where necessary, on the basis of a consultation of the 
relevant database. Member States whose legislation requires creditors to 
assess the creditworthiness of consumers on the basis of a consultation 
of the relevant database may retain this requirement” (emphasis added). 
 
Looking at the legislative history of the Consumer Credit Directive, the original 
controversial intention of the Commission was to introduce a duty to responsible 
lending for lenders and to protect consumers from over-indebtedness by consulting 
centralised credit databases. Such a proposal was suppressed by the European 
Parliament and consequently withdrawn by the Commission amid privacy concerns. 
As a result, in later proposed versions which eventually led to the current text of the 
Consumer Credit Directive it was conceded that those obligations would go beyond 
the purpose of the legislation under discussion and it was agreed to omit the 
regulation of consumer credit reporting, leaving possible concerns about privacy to 
the existing Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (Rott 2009, Ferretti 2007). 
In the end, all what is left from previous proposals of the current law is an 
obligation on lenders to assess an undefined “creditworthiness” of consumers. It has 
to be anticipated that the Consumer Credit Directive excludes from its application 
agreements for the provision on a continuing basis of services or the supply of goods 
                                                 
8
 OJ 1987 L 42/48. 
9
 Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008, OJ 2008 L 133/66 
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of the same kind [Article 3(c)]. This, therefore, already excludes the applicability of 
Article 8 above to insurance services, telecommunications, landlords, etc. 
Moreover, further exemptions are listed in Articles 2(2) to 2(5) which exclude 
certain types of agreements from the scope of the Directive, including its Article 8. 
Examples are credit agreements secured by mortgage or other comparable security, 
interest-free credit or credit repaid within three months, hiring agreements, a good 
number of leasing contracts, credit agreements whose total amount of credit is below 
200 Euros and above 75.000 Euros, and overdrafts. 
Prima facie, thus, someone may be induced to think that there is an explicit 
requirement to consult either PCR or CRA for all of the remaining types of credit 
agreements not excluded by the law. 
However, what the wording of the provision of Article 8(1) suggests is that the 
law now requires, before the conclusion of the credit agreement, that lenders assess 
the consumer’s creditworthiness on the basis of sufficient information. This can be 
done by obtaining the information directly from the consumer where appropriate, and 
only where necessary by consulting the relevant database. The requisite “where 
necessary” makes reference to those Member States whose legislation requires lenders 
to assess by law centralised databases, i.e., PCR (see above). In fact, as Rott (2009) 
points out, “the total harmonisation character of the Directive prohibits Member 
States from introducing such an obligation in all cases (even where this is not 
‘necessary’ in the individual case)” (Rott 2009, pp. 199). Consultation to databases 
such as CRA that is not already covered by national law, therefore, remains non-
mandatory and it relies on the market-developed solutions that do already exist. 
As far as database access is concerned, the EU legislator’s concern is that in the 
case of cross-border credit Member States must ensure access to databases for lenders 
from other Member States on a non-discriminatory basis. Again, this does not mean 
that the consultation in all types of databases (including CRA) is mandatory but that, 
to prevent distortions of competition among EU lenders, the conditions for access of 
lenders from other Member States shall be non-discriminatory (Article 9). 
Moreover, as anticipated above, the Commission’s initial plan to impose 
centralised databases at national level was dismissed by the European Parliament (see 
also Rott 2009, pp. 198-199). Crucially, at any rate, Article 9(4) of the Consumer 
Credit Directive affirms that database access shall be without prejudice to the 
application of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data. 
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Following the European Commission communication on “A Single Market for 
21
st
 century Europe” (European Commission 2007a) accompanied by a Staff Working 
Document “Initiatives In The Area Of Retail Financial Services“ (European 
Commission 2007b) in September 2008, the European Commission appointed an 
Expert Group on Credit Histories (EGCH) (European Commission 2008). Such an 
appointment was made with the objective to identify solutions that will maximize the 
circulation of credit data within the EU. It was based on the assumption that it is very 
important to access credit histories of consumers in promoting competitive retail 
financial services markets (European Commission 2008). Curiously, the EGCH 
seemed to provide an unbalanced composition of its members in favour of the credit 
industry and no independent or academic representatives were involved (European 
Commission 2008). 
In May 2009 the EGCH produced a Report which contains a number of 
recommendations aimed at presenting proposals and informing European policy 
makers about identifying all legal, regulatory, administrative and other obstacles to 
accessing, and exchanging credit data at EU level (EGCH 2009). The Report did not 
depart from the above assumptions of the Commission and did not address a number 
of important issues such as, for example, conflicts with data protection legislation, 
privacy and confidentiality, the role that the organisations/institutions involved play in 
the financial system and/or in society. 
Significantly, consumer representatives did not agree with anything that 
appeared in the Report and refused to endorse it precisely for concerns regarding data 
protection, as well as the usability and relevance of credit data (European 
Commission 2009a, see also European Commission 2008). 
At the time of writing, the unresolved issue of credit data and histories is under 
the process of consultation with the relevant stakeholders. Following this, it seems 
likely that in future there will be EU secondary legislation on credit data and 
databases. As this is in its embryonic phase in the context of the legal and policy 
framework described above, the continuation of this paper sets to stress the 
importance of the existing data protection legislation and put forward an alternative 
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In collecting, processing, and disseminating the personal data of consumers in credit 
operations, Credit Registries must, like any other European data controller, comply 
with data protection legislation. As stressed above, even Article 9 of the Consumer 
Credit Directive requires it explicitly. Moreover, Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty, as 
just ratified by all Member States, upgrades the provision on data protection to a 
“provision of general application” in its Title II alongside other fundamental 
principles of the EU. It also requires the EU legislator to establish a certain and 
unequivocal legal framework for data protection.
11
 
Directive 95/46/EC on data protection serves the double purpose of both 
ensuring the free movement of personal data in the EC internal market and 
guaranteeing a high level of protection for data subjects.  It sets out a high level of 
normative protection. As it establishes a minimum level of harmonisation, the 
Member States must meet the minimum requirements that it sets and cannot go 
beyond nor fall short of these minimum standards. 
The scope of the Directive, which applies to any operations performed upon 
personal data (data processing) is to provide for good data management practices on 
the part of those entities that determine the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data (data controllers).  It contemplates a sequence of general rules on the 
lawfulness of the processing of personal data, the principal ones including the 
following obligations:  
                                                 
10
 The consultation process and future updates are available via 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/credit/history_en.htm 
11
 Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty reads that “1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning him or her.  2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the 
Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules 
relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control 
of independent authorities (…).” The rules adopted under on the basis of Article 16 of the Lisbon 
Treaty shall be without prejudice of its Article 39 on the common foreign and security policy. 
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 to inform in an intelligible form data subjects about the identity of the 
data controller(s) and the use, purpose and recipients of personal data 
(Articles 10 and 11) so that data subjects do not lose control over them; 
 to process personal data only upon obtaining the unambiguous freely 
given specific consent of data subjects after having informed him/her of 
the processing of the data (Article 2h and 7a) or without consent if the 
processing is necessary for the performance of a contract (Article 7b), 
compliance with a legal obligation of the data controller (Article 7c), to 
protect a vital interest of the data subject (Article 7d), or for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise 
of a public authority (Article 7e); 
 to process personal data only for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes (Article 6b) in order to limit data controllers in further uses of 
personal data and for the purpose for which they were collected; 
 to use personal data that are adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further 
processed (Article 6c); 
 to process accurate and up-to-date personal data, taking any reasonable 
step to ensure the rectification or erasure of inaccurate data (Article 6d); 
 to keep the personal data in a form that permits identification of data 
subjects for no longer than necessary (Article 6e) in relation with the 
purpose for which they were processed and depending on the nature and 
type of data in consideration; 
 to guarantee the security of the data against accidental, unauthorised 
access, or manipulation; 
 to provide notification to the national supervisory authority before 
carrying out all or certain types of data processing operations (Article 17). 
 
Ascertaining whether CRA activities truly comply with the law is problematic. 
There are critical concerns about the necessity, adequacy, and relevance of the type of 
data involved and the foundations, or assumptions, upon which consumer credit 
reporting is based in order to determine the predictability of individual human 
behaviours and/or the real financial capability of borrowers. 
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In particular, many doubts arise as far as the legal compliance of information to 
be given to data subjects is concerned (Art. 10 and 11 of the Directive). The general 
objectives of transparency and informational self-determination set by the Directive 
seem seriously compromised by the amount and intelligibility of information that 
should be provided to individuals, the type and number of personal data processed by 
CRA, the indefinite number of actors involved in a spill-over data dissemination, and 
the secondary uses of the same data. 
As far as all the other requirements set by the Directive are concerned (i.e., the 
processing purposes, the adequacy and relevance of the data, accuracy, the data 
retention period), in the end the whole system seems to rely predominantly on the 
consent of the data subjects. This is so because in the absence of the universal 
acceptance of the assumptions upon which consumer credit referencing is based (i.e., 
past behaviour as predictive of future behaviour and the type of data to determine it), 
CRA need to rely on the informed consent of data subjects unambiguously agreeing to 
all the “rules of the game” set by the credit industry unilaterally. Consent, as 
conceived by the law, is a key element that permits the processing of personal data by 
data controllers that would otherwise be forbidden. When consent is validly provided 
by a data subject, this releases data controllers from the restrictions provided by the 
law in a fashion that has been described as an “opt-in” system, i.e., the processing 
becomes lawful from the moment such consent is unambiguously expressed. 
This issue is even more important in a system that is voluntary, as there is no 
necessary requirement, neither legal nor natural, to justify the communication and 
sharing of personal data for the performance of a contract that, after all, is the core of 
the business of lending. Lending money in exchange for profit (the interests on money 
lending) is perfectly possible and most probably lucrative even without the 
intervention of CRA. At the most, data sharing is useful, in the same manner as using 
personal data for marketing purposes is useful. When consumers interact with 
business entities, however, the latter do not necessarily have to disseminate the data 
for marketing reasons, no matter how useful this may be (it is unquestionable that in 
business terms marketing is a very important activity). Indeed, the processing of data 
for marketing purposes should be kept separate from the processing of data for the 
purposes for which they were originally collected. This voluntary aspect about 
marketing is very well accepted by the business community and legal current practice. 
Consumer credit data sharing by CRA should not be treated any differently. 
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Certainly, lenders have a legitimate interest in wanting to know whether credit 
applicants are, in their own terms, creditworthy and how much to price loans. After 
all, they have a legitimate interest in profitability. At the same time, though, 
consumers have not only a legitimate interest but indeed a right with respect to their 
informational privacy, and the law recognises and protects that. 
This view is reinforced by practice, where CRA and lenders rely on consent for a 
lawful processing of consumers’ data. 
But, according to the law, such consent must be informed, unequivocal, specific, and 
given freely. 
Crucially, more than one instance of consent should be required because it 
would otherwise create a problem of absence of specificity. In fact, it would be a 
violation of the information privacy principles to ask consumers to sign 
authorisations, unlimited in subject matter, essentially purporting to give permission 
to data controllers to process any personal data that they unilaterally decide to be 
relevant and disclose that information for expanding purposes to any person. By 
contrast, one of the primary concerns of the Directive is to ensure that data subjects 
consent specifically to all uses for which the data is processed (Article 7). A 
processing based on consent cannot be regarded as lawful if sought for general or 
vague aims, or if the data subject has no possibility of knowing the recipients of 
his/her data. 
Importantly, the above instances of consent should be separate from the consent 
which a customer gives for the processing of his/her data for the specific purposes of 
the credit relationship with the lender at stake. 
Another fundamental feature is that, as a general rule, each instance of consent 
should be the free choice of the individual. Arguably, in fact, in data protection terms, 
consent would be meaningless if people have no option but to consent in order to 
obtain a benefit or a service that could be provided nonetheless. 
It seems to be the case that in the credit reporting process carried out by CRAs, 
consumers do not have much choice if they do not want to be refused credit. The 
consumer's consent with regard to the searches to be carried out in the CRAs’ 
databases, for example, seems to be viewed as either mandatory or assumed. Lenders 
say that the lack of such consent would impede them from taking the credit 
application any further. 
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Moreover, lenders make it a condition in the same instance of consent or in the 
credit contract that at a later stage they have the right to pass the information 
concerning such specific credit line to CRA, which in turn will have the right to 
disseminate the same to their client members, such a condition seemingly non-
negotiable. 
In the absence of alternative contracts with different lenders offering similar 
credit terms (i.e., mainstream lenders) that do not contain the objectionable clause. it 
may be reasonably suggested that consumers have no option but to accept being 
included in credit reference databases (Howells 1995). 
It is vital to stress once more that the expression of will, in order to be regarded 
as having been given voluntarily, must refer explicitly to the processing of personal 
data, and not as a consent to conclude the credit contract. This would already be 
sufficient reason to maintain that the refusal by a data subject to permit an amount of 
processing of personal data unnecessary for the provision of a service required should 
not mean that he/she is failing to consent to that service. A typical example is that of 
commercial marketing: no one denies that it is an important economic activity that 
would increase the profitability of an industry and possibly an economic advantage 
for consumers. It is well accepted in data protection, however, that data controllers 
may not obtain consent to process the data for such a purpose on the understanding 
that the goods or services may not be otherwise be purchased or obtained. According 
to the Directive, and read in conjunction with the proportionality principle, such a 
practice of obtaining consent would lack its freely given element (see for example 
Kuner 2007 ch. 5J., Bainbridge 2005, Jay and Hamilton 2007 ch. 12 and 22). Finally, 
it has to be taken into account that the so-called “mainstream lenders” are part of a 
network system, thus leaving no live option to consumers if they do not want to be 
refused credit. Or – in those few European jurisdictions where money lending is not 
considered usury for rates above a certain threshold set by the law (as opposed to 
those Member States that punish such a practice in criminal law, leaving little or no 
space for lawful subprime lenders) – consumers are left with the alternative option of 
recourse or resorting to subprime lenders, overpaying for the service.
12
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 In most Member States interest rates cannot exceed a maximum rate established by law (a so-called 
“objective control system” approach in the fight against usury). For example, this is the case in Italy, 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In other Member States the usury rates are determined by 
subjective case by case decisions of the national competent Courts that in this way exercise a control 
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With reference to a contract condition which required a consumer to allow 
his/her personal data to be disclosed mandatorily to CRA, the problem is well 
synthesised by Howells in his analysis of the determination of the fairness of clauses 
requiring consent for disclosing positive data vis-à-vis the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive 93/13/EEC:
13
 “such a term may be considered unfair if consumers have no 
option but to accept the term if they desire a particular form of credit and yet be 
acceptable if other creditors offer them similar credit whilst not requiring such 
consent” (Howells 1995, pp. 353). 
In the end, therefore, as has been noted for other areas of law, consent might be 
formally free in the sense that there is not a single or traditional method of forcing 
individuals into a transaction by commercial organisations, but if the costs of not 
consenting are considerable in relation to the situation at stake, and there are no live 
options, then consent cannot be said to be materially free (Leader 2006, Becker 1977, 
Agre 1997). 
There is another important aspect of consent. As construed by the data 
protection legislation, consent is normally a unilateral act, and therefore inherent in its 
nature is that it can be withdrawn by the data subject at any time (see also for example 
Carey 2004, Bainbridge and Pearce 2000). Thus, consent may be withdrawn if the 
data processing is not necessary for the service provided or further processing that is 
compatible, but still different, from the original purpose may be denied. Once the 
assessment of the creditworthiness has tested positive and credit has been granted to a 
consumer, there would be no reason for communicating his/her data to CRA, hence 
there would be no reason to impede the concerned individual’s right to revoke his/her 
consent to the subsequent processing. 
However, consent may not be immediately withdrawn by a data subject 
especially if it has been given under contractual arrangements which limit its 
withdrawal. Once more, in legal terms, such an obligation seems to be incorporated in 
the standard terms of consumer credit agreements, leaving no option to data subjects 
to exercise the right of withdrawal. 
All the above difficulties would probably be acceptable if consumer credit 
reporting by CRA were a necessary step of the credit granting process or a processing 
                                                                                                                                            
over usury practices a posteriori (the so-called subjective control system). For example, the UK and 
Germany rely on a subjective control system. 
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 OJ 1993 L 195/29. 
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in the public interest. It is useful to recall that for the processing of data to be 
considered lawful under these latter circumstances it must be certain that the interest 
at stake is indeed a legitimate one recognised and protected by law. But the 
assessment of the creditworthiness of consumers via CRA is actually not lawful and at 
any rate, consent from the data subject would not even be a necessary requirement by 
law. 
Instead, as in the case of data processing for marketing purposes, an attentive 
application of the law should lead to a different scenario where consumers are given 
the choice to be included or excluded from CRA databases. At the same time, 
however, the freedom for people to decide upon their participation in the system leads 
to a conflicting reflection: a CRA database comprising only of individuals who 
voluntarily accept the inclusion of their data, and who could furthermore withdraw 
their consent for the processing at any time, would have no reason to exist as it could 
not even address the rationale and objective of the system itself. In all likelihood, 
those who eventually decide to be excluded from CRA databases or elect to withdraw 
their consent every time a negative piece of information is created would largely, 
though not exclusively, be precisely those customers that a credit reporting system is 
designed to identify.  Indeed, a database designed to be incomplete would be helpless 
to address any need of the credit industry in the first place. 
Paradoxically, therefore, as the system stands it seems that: 
(i) the essential option that must be offered to consumers by law to accept or 
decline inclusion in the system on the one hand, and  
(ii) the rationale and scope of consumer credit reporting on the other hand, 
are incompatible elements that create a vicious circle. Either the industry violates the 
law abusing consumers' freedom to provide consent, or it abides to this law but feeds 
a system that is ineffective and has no reason to exist. 
In brief, the problem with credit referencing, and then scoring, is that consumers 
are not presented with a real choice, and if the choice were given, this would be 
incompatible with the logic of the reporting system itself. But the law must be 
respected. It has to be noted that the fictitious aspect of consent described has been 
recently recognised by the German legislator who has decided to omit it in CRA 
operations in a law that is due to come into force in May 2010.
14
 For all the 
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considerations made above and the new status granted to data protection by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, it remains to be seen whether such a law, that seems to lower the level of 
normative protection in consumer credit operations, truly complies with EU law. 
Prima facie this may appear questionable and most probably it would deserve the 
attention of a separate analysis. Probably what would also be interesting to see is how 
this law will fit in with any likely future EU legislation on credit histories, as the 
consultation process underway seems to suggest (see above). 
 
An Institutional and Policy Proposal for Debate 
 
The following considerations set out to explore whether it would be possible to 
reconcile the essential needs of the industry with the respect for data protection law, 
its rationale, and the prudential supervision of the financial system in the general 
interest. They also intend to give full consideration to the above-discussed current law 
and policy of the EU as regards the assessment of the creditworthiness of consumers 
and responsible lending and borrowing, although further studies would be necessary 
to identify and understand the full meaning of these terms across the EU. 
So far, this study has attempted to stress that to the extent that the credit 
industry in general, and CRA in particular, need to rely on informed freely given 
consent to legitimise personal data sharing – and, ultimately, to validate the existence 
of the business – the present system and procedures seem undesirable as they create a 
tension with the positive law and its rationale. The inclusion of personal data in CRA 
databases should be left to the voluntary provision by individuals, which most 
probably would make the system useless for satisfying the needs asserted by the credit 
industry. 
Alternatively, if someone wants to take a different point of view, then the 
present legal framework is not adequate for the current practice, but this would mean 
according a higher justificatory status to the activities currently carried out by CRA 
for the stated purposes. Ultimately, it would entail that the existing law should be 
amended to allow CRA to mandate the provision of personal data in their databases. 
For this to be the case and to justify the sacrifice of informational privacy, it would 
first of all be helpful to have some conclusive or at least robust empirical evidence for 
the industry’s needs as addressed by the present commercial form. Then, very strong 
arguments should be put forward in order to outweigh the protection of an established 
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human right, especially if one considers that the tendency of the EC law-makers and 
the national Data Protection Authorities is that of further strengthening protection of 
the civil liberties of citizens living in the EC (European Commission 2003a, European 
Commission 2003b). It appears, in the end, that the heart of the debate and the 
fundamental question referring to credit reporting for consumers is how far the latter 
should be forced to surrender their established rights to informational privacy in the 
interest of the credit industry (under these circumstances, not the general interest), 
bearing in mind that the “utilitarian” concerns of lenders cannot necessarily prevail 
over civil liberty and fundamental human rights concerns.
15
 
A compromise solution, which may provide the industry with important 
information about credit applicants whilst respecting the law and its rationale, could 
be one that focuses on the distinction between public and private credit registries 
(CRA vs. PCR). It is inspired by Jappelli and Pagano’s submission that private and 
public arrangements can be substitutes, provided that the crucial parameter in the 
design of PCR is to set a zero threshold on the reported loans (Jappelli and Pagano 
2006). Also, it relies on Recital 32 of Directive 95/46/EC which provides for the law 
to determine whether a data controller performing a task in the public interest should 
be a public administration or a legal person governed by public law.
16
  This solution 
could also partially address policies against raising levels of consumers’ over-
indebtedness. 
Actually, should evidence be provided that the reporting of consumer financial 
information could be carried out in the general interest, then considerations different 
from those put forward for CRA would apply.
17
 For this to be done, however, it would 
mean accounting the monitoring of consumer operations as important for the stability 
and supervision of the financial system, or for control of the indebtedness of 
individuals vis-à-vis the whole system.
18
 As the Article 29 Working Party warns, it is 
the “legitimate interest in the preservation and stability of the financial system which 
justifies the communication of this information to third parties.”19 This measure, 
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 Directive 95/46/EC, Recital 32. The provision also makes reference to a natural or legal person 
governed by private law “such as a professional association.” 
17
 However note that it has been stressed elsewhere in this work that, at present, some commentators do 
not consider consumer credit as a threat for the stability of financial institutions, unless there are other 
factors that interfere with the economic conditions of a country or the international financial system. 
18
 As stressed earlier, these are indeed the two functions of PCR. 
19
 Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection, Working Document on Blacklists, 11118/02/EN/final, 
Adopted on 3 October 2002, 4. 
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which nevertheless has adverse effects for the privacy of data subjects, should be 
“taken without losing sight of the principles of the Directive, and specific safeguards 
must be in place to uphold data subjects’ legitimate rights.”20 So, for example, data 
subjects should be given the right to be informed about the data processing, the right 
of access, and the right to have erroneous data relating to them rectified. In that event, 
however, the requirement of consent would no longer represent the applicable 
normative provision, thus solving the problem of providing authorisations for data 
processing and lifting any bureaucratic burden on data controllers. 
As explained earlier, such a job is normally carried out by Central Banks or 
other financial authorities within the framework of secondary industry-specific 
legislation. The public sector in all Member States is, in fact, governed by the legality 
principle, the basic rule being the possibility of freely processing data if necessary for 
the performance of a task carried out in the public interest. Moreover, this view would 
be in agreement with the stance taken by the Article 29 Working Party when 
recommending that the sharing of files containing records of a person’s payments 
should have its basis in legislation providing for this course.
21
 
In the regulatory context just envisaged, robust rules would need to be present. They 
would aim at providing the credit industry with essential information whilst 
preserving the respect for and rationale of data protection legislation. 
 
(i) To begin with, the design of the system would need to reflect the purpose and 
policy goals of PCR. As their aim is to monitor the soundness of the financial 
system and the overall indebtedness of borrowers, the underlying uses and 
type of personal information to be shared would be only those strictly 
necessary to achieve such clearly defined goals. As specified earlier, PCR 
would be characterised by strict and unambiguous rules of participation. 
Among them, for example, there would be no need to detail individual loans, 
but only to report the total loan exposure of a borrower in aggregate form. 
Likewise, there would be no indication in the databases of past delays or 
defaults that have been repaid because no assumption is made that past 
behaviour is predictive of future behaviour. In fact, there would only be a need 
to know the existing indebtedness of a borrower. The sharing of data would 






focus only on outstanding liabilities and repayment levels. Thus again, the 
distinction between positive and negative information in the database would 
lose its relevance because it is the amount of remaining debt that shows a 
borrower’s aggregate position vis-à-vis the entire banking system that matters. 
All the more, then, this principle would apply with reference to those past 
credit operations that were concluded with timely payments. Finally, because 
of the rule of strict confidentiality of users, there would be no scope for data 
mining or data manipulation with other data that may attribute a meaning 
different from that of the data taken in a separate context (“function creep”). 
Needless to say, lenders would be able to keep on demanding information 
from borrowers on a case by case basis, as well as to ask for supporting 
documents to validate it. Also, they would be still able to use all other public 
information. 
Each lender’s own risk-management techniques and skills could even form the 
basis for a competitive advantage over other lenders, also reflecting this 
circumstance in the price of credit to be offered. True, the provision of credit 
would take longer and imply a more attentive screening of unknown potential 
customers. At the same time, however, this could contribute to tackling an 
“instant credit culture,” thus also addressing policies to educate consumers and 
contribute to fighting the increasing levels of over-indebtedness of individuals. 
This type of compromise solution, in the end, may form part of the education 
to be provided to consumers in the use – or over-use – of credit, indeed a 
priority in the agenda of European policy-makers. In so doing, it would also 




Likewise, said arrangement would be compatible with the latest policy context 
set by the EU Commission in the area of the supervision of the stability of the 
financial system. Following the recent financial crisis, which has highlighted 
weaknesses in the EU’s fragmented supervisory framework along national 
lines, the Commission has advanced a new Proposal for a Regulation on 
Community macro prudential oversight of the European financial system. This 
Proposal aims to establish strong arrangements that properly address the 
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 See the principles developed by the European Coalition for Responsible Credit, in Reifner 2008. 
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interaction and interdependence between micro and macro prudential risks and 
analysis. In its attempt to redesign and create new institutional structures (such 
as a European Systemic Risk Board), it urges supervisors to monitor and 
assess potential risks for financial stability that may arise from developments 
that can impact on a sectoral level, or at the level of the financial system as a 
whole. In the performance of their duties, they should have access to all the 
information necessary and exchange information while preserving the 
confidentiality of data (European Commission 2009b). To this purpose, PCR 
could play a role in the supervision of the consumer sector. 
(ii) Secondly, there would be a problem with non-bank lenders that do not take 
part in the banking system, or whose failure does not affect a country’s 
financial stability. These are private organisations that should abide by the 
same market rules and laws that every person, whether natural or legal, should 
respect, without benefiting from privileged instruments that may suppress the 
rights of individuals. If these lending organisations do bad business as a result 
of their choices, then they should fail. By contrast, if they are good then they 
should succeed. What matters for this discussion is that there should be no 
interest in their financial health for the stability of the system as a whole and 
they should be allowed to fail as any other company does in a market 
economy. 
(iii) Thirdly, consumer credit lenders that are part of the banking system would 
need to report credit operations to PCR for the assessment of their own 
financial stability. Such a reporting would be done to an institution that has the 
legitimacy and the authority to receive it. And, yet again, this is where the role 
and type of organisation such as CRA institutionally fail. As emphasized 
earlier, it would rather be the task of PCR to include consumer credit 
operations in the wider context of financial reporting for the prudential 
supervision of the system, together with the obligation to abide by the set of 
rules that follows with the participation in such systems. This, inter alia, 
would at least carry the advantage for consumers of not only clear and 
transparent rules and the use of only essential information, but also of 
accountability measures in place for the respect of rules legitimately set 
according to a proper legislative or regulatory procedure. 
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Arguably, the feature that the set of rules of the system originates from the 
legality of a legitimate law-making process would represent per se an 
important guarantee for individual liberty and democracy. Accordingly, in 
fact, any new rules that place a restriction on human rights such as data 
protection should undergo a democracy test. This interpretation is supported 
by the combined reading of Article 6(2) of the EC Treaty and Article 52(3) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights that make explicit reference to the respect 
for the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. In its Article 8.2 the Convention provides that there 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of human rights 
“except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society.”23 Without such a legality process, it would mean using consumer 
credit reporting to make policies without a democratic debate. 
(iv) Fourthly, consumers could find a further guarantee in the legitimacy and 
authority of supervisors/regulators, and a better governance of power which 
would carry with it measures of accountability. Accountability, in fact, may 
play a major role in the management of economic and social resources, 
including the rights of individuals (World Bank 1992). It is a pervasive 
concept defined as "an obligation owed by one person (the accountable) to 
another (the accountee) according to which the former must give account of, 
explain and justify his actions or decisions against criteria of some kind, and 
take responsibility for any fault or damage" (emphasis added) (Lastra and 
Shams 2001). 
A key element at the core of accountability is the content of the obligation of 
the accountable, i.e., the obligation of the holder of power to give an account 
of his decisions or actions, to explain and justify them, and to own the 
responsibility and take appropriate measures of amendment or redress when 
error is proved or harm inflicted. The establishment of clear criteria of conduct 
and specific outcomes are paramount ingredients of the content of such an 
obligation, for any form of accountability presupposes the existence of 
objectives or standards according to which an action or decision may be 
addressed (Lastra and Shams 2001). All these mechanisms of good 
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governance legitimately exist for PCR but are absent as far as CRA is 
concerned. Still, this issue could prove vital for the pursuit of the general 
interest in a more transparent environment, thus ultimately in the protection of 
consumers against possible violations of their rights. 
(v) Finally, the European dimension of consumer credit and market integration 
would require that individuals do not suffer discrimination based on 
nationality. Likewise, the European lenders should be placed in the position to 
compete and offer their services European-wide. Thus, the conferment of an 
information sharing device, in the form envisaged above, to PCRs could make 
a European exchange of information possible. From the practical side, the 
relevant authorities presently in charge of supervising the financial system 
have already developed a communication network amongst themselves, 
showing that appropriate cooperation is already in place without the hurdle of 
creating a system from nothing.
24
 PCR in Europe have already started to work 
together in the so-called Working Group on Credit Registers (WGCR). The 
Group - that is part of the Banking Supervision Committee of the European 
System of Central Banks - has finalised a plan for a pan-European data 
exchange among the PCR of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, 
Portugal, and Spain as well as representatives of the European Central Bank.  
The plan consists of creating a reporting system that allows data exchange on 
a regular basis. This undoubtedly represents an embryonic form of cross-
border exchange of information on loans even if for the time being it provides 
information to financial institutions about the indebtedness of only their 
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 The European institutional architecture for the regulation and supervision of the financial stability of 
the system is a rather complex one which was approved in December 2002 by the Council of Economic 
and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN). The main aim of this fully-fledged reform is to respond to the 
challenges brought by the ongoing process of financial integration in the EC and the introduction of the 
Euro currency. It entails a strict cooperation between regulatory and supervisory national authorities, 
both across sectors and across countries, in order to obtain an optimal knowledge of European cross-
border financial activity allowing convergence towards supervisory best practices and ensuring 
financial stability.  The institutional arrangements foresee a sectoral and decentralised model of 
financial regulation and supervision leaving those functions at national level but ensuring cooperation 
among the national regulators and supervisors. In compliance with Art. 105(5) of the EC Treaty, the 
European System of Central Banks contributes to the conduct of the policies pursued by the competent 
authorities in relation to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. At the same time, the Treaty 
leaves open the possibility that the European Central Bank, as the institution setting monetary policy, 
gains some supervisory responsibility with the exception of insurance companies. Thus, the explicit 
coordination among competent national supervisors and the implicit coordination between the latter 
and monetary policy-makers take place in the Banking Supervision Committee of the European Central 
Bank which has become the legitimate forum for cooperation between supervisors and central bankers 
in the EC. For a detailed description see Nieto and Penalosa 2004. 
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corporate customers and does not apply to the consumer credit sector 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2005). 
The major problems behind the creation of interfaces among the consumer 
credit information systems of the existing PCR seem to be the different 
designs regarding coverage, reporting thresholds, and type of information 
reported (Jappelli and Pagano 2006). Nevertheless, the existing technologies 
in use in the sector support the view that, for such a system to be 
complemented, radical organisational or innovative measures would not be 
required. Certainly, there may be one-off costs in the adaptation of existing 
systems or the creation of new ones for countries that may have a different 
system in place. However, the benefits identified herein would probably 
justify them, bearing in mind that the present arrangements for consumer 
credit reporting by CRA are not cost-free, and include also the profits of the 
service provider. 
(vi) Under recent financial practice, investors in financial markets have been 
offered and have invested in asset backed securities collateralised with a 
portfolio of mortgage or other household loans. However, with the system 
currently in place, in particular CRA, they lacked the information about the 
quality of the underlying assets and the level of indebtedness of debtors in 
order to determine the level of risk of their investments. Likewise, also those 
arranging securitisation transactions, including rating agencies, lacked 
information about loan portfolios and debtors’ indebtedness. This has 
contributed to the spread of what became toxic assets within financial markets. 
Probably, with the use of publicly available information via PCR, at least 
credit rating agencies would have been able to provide more accurate 
information to investors and to anticipate some problems thus limiting the 




In summary, to conclude, the inclusion of consumer financial data, in an appropriately 
regulated form, in public credit registries may be used not only to strengthen bank 
supervision but could also serve to improve the quality of credit analysis by financial 
institutions to the extent that this is necessary for the general interest of financial 
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stability and the monitoring of the indebtedness of the individuals towards the system.  
It would respond to, and comply with, the current requirement of the new Consumer 
Credit Directive which poses an obligation on lenders to assess the creditworthiness 
of consumers while at the same time necessitating the respect of the Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC. 
On a micro-economic level, lenders would be able to detect and tightly control 
their credit provisioning and the amount of overdue and defaulted debt in circulation, 
whilst PCR would supervise and control the level of indebtedness on a macro-
economic basis.
25
 In this way, fundamental privacy rights and civil liberties could be 
better preserved and, should any sacrifice of the latter occur as an eventual necessity, 
then it would be in the general interest but still within a regulated environment 
designed to stem excesses and abuses, including possible secondary uses or any 
function creep. 
Last but not least, the supervisors or regulators of the Member States could 
legitimately engage in a European exchange of information that could not only 
strengthen the supervision of the European financial system, but could also foster the 
Internal Market by removing barriers to the basic Community freedoms and taking a 
step in support of the creation of a single European market in consumer credit where 
consumers not only receive adequate protection but, as citizens, are better safeguarded 
from surveillance, classification, profiling, or social selection and sorting.  For this to 
occur, there would need to be agreement about the standardisation of the type and use 
of information and the setting of a very low – possibly zero – threshold in PCR 
(Jappelli and Pagano 2006). 
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 For similar considerations about the value of public credit registries see also Majinoni et al 2004. It 
may be worth a note that the new recommendations of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 
(so-called Basel II) on the methods aimed to determine the necessary capital requirements of banks 
permit for the first time the latter to group their loans to private individuals into a retail portfolio to be 
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See Olegario 2003, Schwarcz 2001, Jackson 2001 
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On the practical side, admittedly, within the envisaged compromise solution, it 
could be the case that the substitution of CRA with cost-effective PCR would put the 
former out of business. It is hard to say whether this would be the necessary outcome 
or not. What can be noted is that CRA already engage in other activities that beyond 
data sharing and reporting. Examples are the various types of services that many CRA 
already provide to lenders, including credit scoring
26
 and data analysis for marketing 
or product development. They may make use of anonymised data or, as software or 
algorithm providers, of personal data of each lender’s own portfolio. These are only 
modest and incomplete examples. The suggestion, in the end, is that businesses, in 
order to survive new regulations or institutional reforms, would be required to 
innovate so as to adapt to the market which will develop from such changes, as 
happens with changes of whatever nature. 
Almost certainly, the proposal put forward in this paper will raise further 
questions and controversy. At this stage, however, it is intended as an early policy 
consideration with the precise aim of being a starting point for stimulating further 
scholarly debate and research, particularly among lawyers, consumer organisations, 
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